by Senior First Officer Cristiano Di Murro<\/p>\n
The objective of aviation safety management systems is to
\n1. Proactively manage safety,
\n2. Identify and report potential safety hazards,
\n3. Determine risk to operational safety; and
\n4. Implement risk controls to mitigate identified risk.
\nWhen an aviation service provider evaluates their risk to operational safety,
\nthey have to ask themselves a very pointed, and sometimes uncomfortable
\nquestion: “What is our risk appetite?”
\nThe term Acceptable defines an aviation service provider\u2019s minimum level of
\nacceptable risk for a given safety issue. \u201cAcceptable\u201d describes the need for
\nno further mitigatory actions on the part of the service provider for the safety
\nconcern in question. This determination will be made based on the
\nprobability and severity of the evaluated safety concern.
\nWhy Is Acceptable Level of Safety Subjective?
\nAbsolute safety is an impossible goal, yet service providers need to be able
\nto set standards for how much risk is admissible. ALoS is the response to
\nthis dilemma. Because of this, ALoS is \u201cexclusively concerned with safety
\nperformance measurement\u201d.
\nWhat this means is that, in terms of safety performance, ALoS marks the
\npoint at which, for any given hazard or potential mishap:
\n-The current level of safety performance remains \u201cgood enough\u201d;
\n-Risk control measures needed to further increase the safety margin for the
\nhazard\/mishap would be unreasonable\/unrealistic to implement; and
\n-Risk controls are effective enough that the residual risk is willingly taken on
\nby the service provider.
\nIt\u2019s important to note that while defining a level of acceptable safety is a
\nrequirement for providers, it\u2019s up to each provider to establish just what is
\nand what isn\u2019t acceptable. In this way, service providers define their ALoS,
\nand then show (e.g., with safety data), that they operating within an
\nacceptable range of risk.
\nAcceptable Level of Safety is subjective and can change as the environment
\nchanges. As an operator becomes more successful and attracts more
\nclients, this operator may become emboldened and increase their risk
\nappetite. When one considers an inverse economic scenario, an operator
\nmay determine that their ALoS is too aggressive and that they need to either:<\/p>\n
-Adjust their exposure to particularly risky hazards; or
\n-Adjust operational processes to reduce risk by implementing supplemental
\ncontrol measures.
\nRelationship between Risk Matrix and Acceptable Level of Safety
\nThe Risk Matrix is the backbone of ALoS in terms of:
\n-Drawing line between acceptability\/unacceptability;
\n-Ensuring consistent assessment of acceptable and not acceptable risk;
\n-Setting benchmarks for residual assessments of allowed exposure; and
\n-Determining organizational authority level required to accept identified risk.
\nDuring the early stages of an aviation SMS’ risk management process,
\nservice providers use initial risk assessments from reported safety issues
\nand audit findings to decide whether or not the evaluated concern meets the
\ncriteria for acceptable risk. For example, an organization might define
\nacceptability as any risk assessment that is:
\n-\u201cGreen,\u201d low-risk issues, and all other risk assessments requiring further
\nmitigatory action;
\n-\u201cYellow\u201d or \u201cgreen\u201d (medium or low) risk issues, with only high-risk issues
\nrequiring further action; or
\n-Medium-low issues, where the risk assessment is on the lower \u201chalf\u201d of the
\nrisk matrix.
\nThe reason there is a variance between aviation service providers is either:
\nDiffering willingness to take on more risk as being acceptable (risk appetite);
\nand Different defining criteria for either probability or severity.
\nALoS absolutely requires very clear criteria for probability and severity in
\norder to have consistent risk assessments across the life span of the
\nimplemented SMS.
\nComplex operators may have more than one risk matrix in their aviation
\nSMS. Each risk matrix will be used to risk assess safety concerns for their
\nspecific division, whether the “division” is:
\n-Functional (flight ops, maintenance, engineering, ground side, etc); or<\/p>\n
-Geographical region (North America, Middle East, Africa).
\nWhile some aviation service providers have distinct risk matrices for each
\ndivision, the general rule of thumb is to use the same risk matrix across the
\nentire company. While this is not required, it is certainly a best practice as it
\nincreases consistency and reduces ambiguity and confusion among the
\nmanagers who have to review reports based on risk assessments.
\nRisk matrix criteria are simply the tangible \u201cmarkers\u201d of a particular level of
\nseverity\/probability. For example, you might define specific criteria for a level
\nof severity based on:
\n-Financial loss;
\n-Damage to equipment; Injury\/loss of life;
\n-Effects on operations; and Environmental damages.
\nThe more criteria listed for each level of severity the better. Next, you might
\ndefine specific criteria for a level of probability based on:
\n-Number of times occurred in company\/industry in the past; or
\n-Rate per number of flight operations expected in the future (such as on
\noccurrence in 100k operations, however, you define operations) given
\nexisting conditions and controls.
\nEstablishing an Acceptable Level of Safety
\nOperators should create their risk matrix criteria, and decide which
\ncombination of severity likelihood is the minimum requirement for
\nacceptance. Best practices for creating a risk matrix that is swiftly being
\nadopted is to color code cells and maybe labels as:
\n-Low-risk items as green, indicating “acceptable;”
\n-All medium risk issues (if applicable) in yellow indicating “acceptable with
\nmitigation measures;”
\n-Higher grade medium risk issues (if applicable) in orange, also indicating
\n“acceptable with mitigation measures;” and
\n-Unacceptable risk will be red.<\/p>\n
Final Thought Justifying Criteria for ALoS in Aviation Industry<\/p>\n
As discussed, you need to justify your established criteria for the level of
\nacceptable risk. Justifying risk matrix criteria involves using:
\n-Safety performance indicators; and
\n-Safety performance targets.
\nSafety targets and key performance indicators are composed using:
\n-Organizational safety goals and objectives;
\n-Safety initiatives and feedback originating from the civil aviation authority
\n(CAA); Safety data, such as from an aviation safety database;
\n-Safety charts and metrics; and
\n-Demonstration of \u201cacceptable\u201d issue safety performance.
\nA good way to begin this process is to review:
\n-Key performance indicators (KPIs) related to risk assessments;
\nLeading indicators related to risk assessments; or
\n-Custom graphs that show hazard classifications based on risk
\nassessments.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
by Senior First Officer Cristiano Di Murro The objective of aviation safety management systems is to 1. Proactively manage safety, 2. Identify and report potential safety hazards, 3. Determine risk to operational safety; and 4. Implement risk controls to mitigate identified risk. When an aviation service provider evaluates their risk to operational safety, they have […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"qubely_global_settings":"","qubely_interactions":"","bwfblock_default_font":"","order-bump-settings":[],"_wpfnl_thankyou_order_overview":"on","_wpfnl_thankyou_order_details":"on","_wpfnl_thankyou_billing_details":"on","_wpfnl_thankyou_shipping_details":"on","footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1776","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"blocksy_meta":{"styles_descriptor":{"styles":{"desktop":"","tablet":"","mobile":""},"google_fonts":[],"version":6}},"gutentor_comment":0,"qubely_featured_image_url":null,"qubely_author":{"display_name":"Aereo","author_link":"https:\/\/www.thelabsky.com\/author\/airplane\/"},"qubely_comment":0,"qubely_category":"Uncategorized<\/a>","qubely_excerpt":"by Senior First Officer Cristiano Di Murro The objective of aviation safety management systems is to 1. Proactively manage safety, 2. Identify and report potential safety hazards, 3. Determine risk to operational safety; and 4. Implement risk controls to mitigate identified risk. When an aviation service provider evaluates their risk to operational safety, they have…","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thelabsky.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1776"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thelabsky.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thelabsky.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thelabsky.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thelabsky.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1776"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.thelabsky.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1776\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1777,"href":"https:\/\/www.thelabsky.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1776\/revisions\/1777"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thelabsky.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1776"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thelabsky.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1776"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thelabsky.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1776"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}